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THE EXECUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS*
REGINALD PARKERt
A dog's obeyed in office.-King Lear, iv, 6
N OUR complex modern society the dynamics of the law is a process whereby
norms of a more general nature are applied from step to step by the crea-
tion of more particularized special norms.' The Constitution ordains in a
very general fashion that there shall be statutes, a mandate which is left to
Congress to carry out. The latter in turn enacts statutes whose further particu-
larization might be left to administrative agencies empowered to promulgate
regulations which concretize the law further. This is often referred to as "filling
in the details," which the lawmaker left to the agency. 2 The agency then applies
the law to still more concrete situations by making individual determinations
which may be arrived at after a so-called quasi-judicial procedure, or one more
informal, or even after a procedure that is devoid of any formalities, as the
acceptance or refusal of a package for mailing pursuant to general postal regula-
tions that are in turn based on postal statutes enacted under the Constitution.'
Some of these decisions may need no further enforcement; they are ipso facto
enforced upon rendition.4 If the decision needs no further enforcement, or if it
is complied with by the person against whom it is rendered, no further descent
on the legal stepladder is required. However, decisions, whether judicial or ad-
ministrative, that are neither self-executory nor acquiesced in necessitate fur-
ther concretization. Thus, a court decision which is neither executed by itself,
nor obeyed by the addressee of the judgment must in some fashion be carried
out, or "executed." This, then, is the ultimate sanction which is inherent in the
decision; if the affected party fails to obey, the decision can be enforced by
deprivation of property, imprisonment, etc. So, too, must administrative de-
cisions be capable of further enforcement if their command is disobeyed. The
mandate of an administrative decision must be translated into fact, either
through obedience by the addressee or through some physical act, often co-
* This article is the substance of a chapter of the author's forthcoming book, Adminis-
trative Law, scheduled by Prentice-Hall for publication in 1957.
f Professor of Law, Willamette University.
1 For an expos6 of the legal hierarchy consult Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 135
(1945), and the remarks of Justice Jackson, note 2 infra.
2 For a recent, lucid discussion see Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in FTC v. Ruberoid
Co., 343 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1952).
3 U.S. Const. Art. 1, §7.
4 For instance, a tax authority's "decision" to grant a tax refund by mailing a check to the
claimant.
6 Such as a divorce decree or a decision dismissing a plaintiff's action.
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ercive, of a governmental organ. This ultimate enforcement of an administrative
decision we may call administrative execution. The manner of administrative
execution is a field exhibiting a remarkable dearth of any writing or organized
legal theory.' This is the field the following discussion will survey.
Typical of the prevailing opinion is the statement that, at least in most
instances, "administrative action depends for enforcement upon sanctions im-
posed by courts." 7 This standard opinion has found implicit judicial approval in
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,8 where Justice Brandeis, for the Court,
reaffirmed the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act, because,
among other things, "[n]o power to enforce an order is conferred upon the
Board. To secure enforcement, the Board must apply to a Circuit Court of
Appeals for its affirmance."' Statements like these could indeed lead one to be-
lieve that a statute enabling an agency to enforce its orders by means other than
through appeal to the courts is unconstitutional. Nothing could be farther from
correct.
It is generally, though vaguely, recognized that "a small portion" of adminis-
trative action does not depend on court action for enforcement, such as "the
withholding of benefits, a governmental refusal to contract under the Walsh-
Healey Act, exclusion or deportation of an alien, refusal of the post office to de-
liver fraudulent or obscene mail, refusal of clearance to vessels.... 2,10
This list alone, even if it were complete, would be large enough to render
questionable the notion that agency action typically depends on the courts. Of
course, the enumeration must be properly comprehended, for it includes the
correct as well as the wrong decision." Moreover, the "withholding of benefits"
may include anything the government declares to be a "benefit,"" and the gov-
6 Consult Davis, Administrative Law 750-54 (1951); Hart, An Introduction to Adminis-
trative Law 751-68 (2d ed., 1950); Gellhorn and Byse, Administrative Law: Cases and Com-
ments 621-25 (1954); Parker, Administrative Law 283-87 (1952); Parker, Contempt Pro-
cedure in the Enforcement of Administrative Orders, 40 Ill. L. Rev. 344 (1946); The Role of
Contempt Proceedings in Enforcing Orders of the NLRB, 54 Col. L. Rev. 603 (1954). None of
these writings purport to cover the problem in its entirety.
7Davis, op. cit. supra note 6, at 750. Consult also Mayers, The American Legal System 407
(1955): "In our system the traditional method by which law enforcement officers may seek to
enforce upon the individual compliance with the law has been the judicial proceeding. ..
8 303 U.S. 41 (1938). 8 Ibid., at 48.
10 Davis, op. cit. supra note 6, at 750; Mayers, op. cit. supra note 7, at 403-15.
n Because "Djurisdiction ... carries with it jurisdiction to decide erroneously as well as
correctly." Tooze, J., for the court in Ashford v. Ashford, 201 Ore. 206, 220, 268 P.2d 382, 387
(1954). And "discretion implies selection, the power to choose, to weigh, and to evaluate, yes,
even the power to be wrong." Smith, J., dissenting in Hazel Park Racing Ass'n v. Racing
Comm'r, 343 Mich. 1, 14, 71 N.W.2d 692, 698 (1955).12 See, e.g., the broad language in Hobby v. Hodges, 215 F.2d 754, 759 (C.A. 10th, 1954)
(social security "benefits"); Miller v. United States, 124 F.Supp. 203, 205 (W.D. Mo., 1954),
noted in 23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 620 (1955) (death "benefits" under Servicemen's Indemnity
Act). Consult also the brief comment on "grants" and "benefits" in Attorney General's Man-
ual on the Administrative Procedure Act 27-28 (1947).
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emnment's refusal to contract under the Walsh-Healey Act 3 may in fact include
a refusal in violation of the Act.'4 The government's right to exclude aliens in-
cludes the faculty to exclude, for the time being at least, anybody thought to be
an excludable alien, 5 even as the post office's right to refuse to deliver obscene
mail cannot be easily divorced from its de facto power to exclude from delivery
any mail which the postal authorities think to be "obscene."' 16
The fact that the aggrieved parties may often seek and obtain judicial re-
dress' 7 is a recognition far removed from a statement to the effect that agencies
cannot put teeth into their actions without the courts' help. Of course one may
argue, so far as decisions subject to judicial review are concerned, that eventual-
ly no agency action can become law unless either the courts have spoken or
their review was not sought. To say, then, that the decisions of the postal
authorities or immigration authorities alluded to above are not "final" unless
sanctioned by a review court is no doubt sound theory as far as the statement
goes. Whether, however, this is a meaningful statement in reality depends upon
the readiness and swiftness with which the courts are able to act. M. Gregoire
spent four years in the jails of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
until a court found that it was unlawful to detain him. 8 It can be said that for
him the administrative decision that declared him to be an enemy alien subject
to detention was temporarily executed. Thus, in addition to agency execution of
unreviewable administrative decisions there are many more instances of
agency execution of decisions pending their judicial review.
The "withholding of benefits" has been quoted above as one example of non-
judicially enforced action.j9 It is not, however, just "benefits" that the govern-
13 Public Contracts Act of 1936,49 Stat. 2036 (1936), 41 U.S.C.A. §§35-45 (1952).
14 See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Covington Mills v. Durkin, 3 Pike
& Fischer Ad. Law (2d series) 221 (D. D.C., 1953) (stay order granted, under Fulbright amend-
ment to Walsh-Healey Act, against wage order); Miller, Administrative Discretion in the
Award of Federal Contracts, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 781 (1955).
25 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (resident alien unlawfully excluded and
held at San Francisco and Ellis Island for two years). Consult Constitutional Restraints on the
Expulsion and Exclusion of Aliens, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 440 (1953).
6 Summerfield v. Sunshine Book Co., 221 F.2d 42 (App. D.C., 1954), cert. denied 349 U.S.
921 (1955), noted in 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1458 (1955) (enforcement of postmaster's order for-
bidding mail delivery on account of obscenity enjoined). Cf. Jeffries v. Olesen, 121 F.Supp.
463 (S.D. Calif., 1954) (postmaster's fraud order forbidding use of mails to advertise male
genital aid for sexual intercourse enjoined); Stanford v. Lunde Arms Corp., 211 F.2d 464
(C.A. 9th, 1954) (postmaster's order to declare air rifle unmailable as "firearm" set aside).
But cf. Stanard v. Olesen, 74 S.Ct. 768 (1954) (administrative remedies must be exhausted
prior to review of postmaster's order impounding party's mail and keeping it apart pendente
lite). For a good discussion consult de Grazia, Obscenity and the Mail: A Study of Adminis-
trative Restraint, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 608 (1955).
17 But see, e.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940), and Stanard v. Olesen,
74 S.Ct. 768 (1954). For an exhaustive discussion of what is judicially reviewable consult
Davis, Unreviewable Administrative Action, 15 F.R.D. 411 (1954).
I8 United States ex rel. Gregoire v. Watkins, 164 F.2d 137 (C.A. 2d, 1947). Consult also
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (C.A. 2d, 1949), cert. denied 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
19 Quoted in text at note 10 supra.
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ment may withhold without first asking the courts, but anything else that lends
itself to being withheld. The power, subject to deferred judicial review, not to
grant a license, issue a passport or appoint a person to the civil service may still
be mentioned as somewhat expanded illustrations of "benefits." And with the
post office's authority not to deliver certain mail can be paralleled the infinitely
more frequent decisions by which postal authorities refuse to accept mailing
matter unless there has been compliance with certain conditions. The question of
whether something is a periodical, a book, a package or first-class matter may
be of greatest importance to the sender, yet the mailing authorities will of
course decide it, usually quite informally, without the need for judicial author-
ization even though judicial control may be exercised at a later date2 Actually,
as will be observed, it is any negative decision that can be executed by the
agency concerned.
In short, it appears that there are many conceivable ways to execute, at
least preliminarily, administrative decisions by administrative agencies. On
the other hand, there are those decisions and acts which the administrative
branch of the government must rely on the judiciary to enforce, in every sense
of the word. As this subject is new and its treatment novel, it is advisable to
give an outline of what may be expected:
A. Some agency decisions are not judicially reviewable. Most, though not
all, of these are executed by the issuing agency.
B. Agencies may at times execute their own decisions, notwithstanding
subsequent judicial review. This includes many affirmative decisions and all
negative ones, except for those included in the first category above. In other
words, negative decisions are never executed through the courts even though
they be judicially reviewable.
C. Agencies may at times execute reviewable decisions only after the de-
cisions have become final for the reason that review has become foreclosed
because it was not sought at all, or because it was sought unsuccessfully.
D. Some agency decisions are executed through the acceptance of the
decision by another party, such as where a mutually exclusive license is granted
to one and correspondingly denied to another party. These decisions may or
may not be subject to subsequent judicial review.
E. There are some affirmative administrative decisions that can be executed
only through the judicial branch of the government.
Execution of Administrative Decisions Not Subject to Judicial Review
This is the category usually alluded to by writers who refer to execution, or
"enforcement,"'" of agency actions without the intervention of the judicial
machinery. Yet it is the least important in our group. Just how large the field of
0 E.g., Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88 (1904).
21 The term "enforce" is also used, especially in NLRB cases, to denote a review court's
approval and confirmation of an administrative decision. See the language used in Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) (quoted in text at note 9 supra).
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nonreviewable decisions is seems uncertain.22 However, it is not necessary to
investigate the penumbra of unreviewable administrative decisions;23 it will
suffice to examine the mode in which a few such decisions are executed.
An example of undisputably unreviewable decisions appears to be claims de-
cided by the so-called International Claims Commission, an independent federal
agency set up under the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 to deal
with certain claims of American citizens against Yugoslavia.24 The Commis-
sion's decisions are expressly declared final and unreviewable.25 Consequently,
the Commission alone was to decide how much, if anything, a given claimant
was to receive, and was to pay out claims accordingly.26 The Commission thus
executed its decisions by granting or withholding payment without court con-
trol.
2 7
There are but few other instances of express statutory preclusion of judicial
review. To stay in the international field for one more instance, the decisions of
American consuls abroad in granting or denying visas to enter the United States
are final and unreviewable.2 s More familiar examples of unreviewable agency-
executed decisions include orders concerning veterans' claims under the
Servicemen's Indemnity Act,29 excess-profits determinations,30 and similar
government contract renegotiations."'
2 2 Davis, op. cit. supra note 17; Davis, Administrative Law 812-67 (1951); Parker, Ad-
ministrative Law 262-64 (1952).
23 The very existence of this ambiguous dark area appears to be a potent argument against
any attempt during our present stage of administrative-legal development to codify general
administrative law and procedure, since it is totally unsettled in its most essential point.
Consult Parker, op. cit. supra note 22, at 63-64; Madden, Review of Parker, Administrative
Law, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 680, 686 (1952).
24 64 Stat. 13 (1949), 22 U.S.C.A. §§1622-27 (1952).
2 Ibid., at §1623(a)(b)(h).
28 A recent decision so holding, however, indicates by dictum that there might be situations
of a constitutional nature that might yet warrant judicial review. De Vegvar v. Gillilland,
228 F.2d 640, 642 (App. D.C., 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 994 (1956).
i The functions of the Commission were later transferred to the Foreign Claims Settle-
ment Commission. Reorg. Plan No. I of 1954, 19 Fed. Reg. 3985 (1954).
28 United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984 (App. D.C., 1929), cert. denied 279
U.S. 868 (1929); Auerbach, Immigration Laws of the United States 24 (1955).
This fact has been termed "administrative absolutism" [Rosenfield, Consular Non-Re-
viewability: A Case Study in Administrative Absolution, 41 A.B.A.J. 1109 (1955); for the
problem of nonreviewability of the exclusion of aliens compare Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953),with Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953)] and
has given rise to at least two works of art that tend to show God's country in a light some-
what different from what Emma Lazarus' famous poem on the Statue of Liberty intended to
proclaim. Laura Z. Hobson, Trespassers (1943); Gian Carlo Menotti, The Consul (1950).
29 54 Stat. 1197 (1940), 38 U.S.C.A. §11(a)(2) (1954); Cyrus v. United States, 226 F.2d 416
(C.A. 1st, 1955); Acker v. United States, 226 F.2d 575 (C.A. 5th, 1955); Miller v. United
States, 124 F.Supp. 203 (W.D. Mo., 1954), noted in 23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 620 (1955).
30 Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540 (1946).
1 Int. Rev. Code §1481(a) (1) (D) (1954), 26 U.S.C.A. §1481(a) (1) (D) (1955); Renegotiation
Act, 56 Stat. 245 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. App. 1191(e)(1) (1951); Spaulding v. Doug-
las Aircraft Co., 154 F.2d 419 (C.A. 9th, 1946).
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These types of decisions commonly involve governmental funds or grants.
However, the instances of nonreviewability are by no means confined to this
category. Some courts, at least, have held that administrative decisions whereby
an agency declines to exercise its "jurisdiction"3 2 are not capable of judicial
review.3" However negative such a ruling may seem, its effect is positive. A
decision that the agency will not prosecute a certain conduct complained of,
means that the conduct may be continued. For example, a party sought to
persuade the SEC "to assume jurisdiction to investigate and regulate the
issuance and sale" of travelers' checks by the American Express Company, but
the Commission refused, and the refusal was held to be nonreviewable.3 4 The
NLRB has repeatedly refused to exercise its authority and the courts have
held this to be an unreviewable exercise of administrative discretion. 3
Administrative decisions concerning the promotion, demotion or removal of
Civil Service employees are unreviewable if the prescribed procedure was fol-
lowed, which in the normal case of dismissal of a civil servant amounts to no
more than that he be informed of the charges against him and be given an op-
portunity to answer in writing.3" Thus if the decision rendered after this pro-
cedure amounts to a dismissal, it is executed by the agency without judicial
aid.37
"'Jurisdiction' competes with 'right' as one of the most deceptive of legal pitfalls."
Frankfurter, J., dissenting in City of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 695 (1944).
Consult also Parker, op. cit. supra note 22, at 109-114 (1952).
31 Consult notes 34 and 35 infra.
31 Leighton v. SEC, 221 F.2d 91 (App. D.C., 1955).
36Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v. NIRB, 187 F.2d 418 (C.A. 9th, 1951), cert. denied 342
U.S. 815 (1951); Hourihan v. NLRB, 201 F.2d 187 (App. D.C., 1952) (court has no power to
order Board's general counsel to issue complaint or to require Board to issue an order where no
complaint was filed); see NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S.
675, 684 (1951); Manhattan Construction Co. v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 320 (C.A. 10th, 1952),
noted in 53 Col. L. Rev. 280 (1953) (dismissal of proceedings under Section 10(k) of the
NLRA by Board and general counsel not a final order and hence not reviewable). Consult New
Entrance to the "No Man's Land": State Injunction of Unfair Labor Practices as Torts
Following NLRB Declination of Jurisdiction, 65 Yale L. J. 86 (1955). Board orders dismissing
a complaint after issuance are reviewable. E.g., NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co.,
341 U.S. 665 (1951); Judicial Review of Board Dismissal of a Charge under §10(k) of the
Amended NLRA, 53 Col. L. Rev. 280 (1953). Cf. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co.v. FPC, 201
F.2d 334 (C.A. 1st, 1953) (FPC order dismissing petition for temporary permit not merely
preliminary nor procedural, hence reviewable).
3862 Stat. 354 (1948), 5 U.S.C.A. §652 (1950). "[tlhe determination of whether or not an
employee's discharge would promote the efficiency of the Government service was vested in
the administrative officer...." Gadsden v. United States, 100 F.Supp. 455 (Ct. Cl., 1951),
cert. denied 342 U.S. 856 (1951). Consult Keyton v. Anderson, 229 F.2d 519 (App. D.C.,
1956); Cole v. Young, 226 F.2d 337 (App. D.C., 1955); Williams v. Cravens, 210 F.2d 874
(App. D.C., 1954); Powell v. Brannan, 196 F.2d 871 (App. D.C., 1952); Carter v. Forrestal,
175 F.2d 364 (App. D.C., 1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 832 (1949) (citing many precedents).
37 Some courts have seen to it that at least the employee's meager procedural safeguards be
observed by the agencies. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) (Loyalty Board must not re-
open its case on its own motion); Roth v. Brownell, 215 F.2d 500 (App. D.C., 1954), cert.
denied 348 U.S. 863 (1954) (review of unlawful removal from classified civil service granted);
see Burns v. McCrary, 130 F.Supp. 908 (E.D. N.Y., 1955) (injunction granted not to remove
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Labor agencies' decisions concerning the certification of unions are review-
able only to a limited extent. Though the leading Supreme Court case is any-
thing but lucid,3 8 a railway labor union certification is probably unreviewable,
in which case the decision falls clearly within the category of agency execution.
NLRB certifications, on the other hand, are reviewable but only belatedly, i.e.,
when the employer refuses to bargain with the certified union and as a result is
held to have committed an unfair labor practice under Section 8(5) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.39 This will be discussed below.4"
As noted earlier, it is not necessary here to attempt the impossible and
ascertain the limits of judicial review. For even in many border cases the agencies
are able to execute their decisions, whether judicial review is held to be available
or not.M
Execution of Administrative Decisions Subject to Subsequent Review
Inasmuch as this group forms the main bulk of the material under considera-
tion in this article, it is apposite to clarify a theoretical point, alluded to above.4 2
The argument might be raised that if an agency decision is later set aside by a
review court, the agency decision is a nullity and its previous execution by the
agency simply amounted to an unlawful act. Thus, the argument might run, the
unlawful detention of M. Gregoire was nothing more than an unlawful imprison-
ment rather than the execution of a decision. However, the fallacy of this
argument is obvious. The acts of an agency, later reversed by higher authority,
such as a court, are "unlawful" only in that they are not, as the reviewing tri-
bunal rules, in accordance with the law. But they are not "illegal," as crimes,
torts or breaches of contracts are, nor are they legal wrongs. The Attorney
General did have jurisdiction to detain and his jurisdiction included the power
to render a wrong decision that is yet not an "illegal" one. His act entailed no
sanction, as the second Gregoire case43 most clearly shows, and it was no more a
plaintiff pendente lite); Richardson, Problems in the Removal of Federal Civil Servants, 54
Mich. L. Rev. 219 (1955); Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United
States, 33 B.U.L. Rev. 176 (1953); Review of Removal of Federal Civil Service Employees,
52 Col. L. Rev. 787 (1952); "The civil servants are treated as no individual would treat those
on whose services he relies." Pollard, The Evolution of Parliament 256 (2d ed., 1926). But this
kind of judicial review, if it can be so called, has no suspensive effect and hence falls at best into
the category of decisions executed by agencies subject to subsequent review.
38 Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 (1943);
Brotherhood, etc. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 201 F.2d 36,38-39 (C.A. 4th, 1953).
39AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); Foreman & Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 396
(C.A. 9th, 1954); Timken-Detroit Axle Co. v. NLJRB, 197 F.2d 512 (C.A. 6th, 1952).
40 Consult discussion at 306-7 infra.
41 This does not mean, however, that every unreviewable agency decision can be agency
executed. Consult notes 117, 118 infra.
4 Consult discussion pertaining to M. Gregoire at 294 supra.
43 Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (C.A. 2d, 1949), cert. denied 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
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legal wrong than a trial court decision that is reversed on appeal. An administra-
tive agency that executes its own decision may act contrary to law and hence the
decision will be set aside and its further execution terminated, if that is still
possible, but in so acting contrary to law the agency did not violate the legal
order either by rendering or executing its decision.
It is therefore correct to say that, similar to lower court decisions under
Anglo-American civil and criminal court procedures,44 many administrative
decisions are capable of execution even though they may be subject to review.
The effect of court decisions, however, can frequently be suspended through the
posting of security. The extent to which agency decisions may be stayed pend-
ing review is far less certain.45
The largest group in this category is no doubt that of the negative orders.
However questionable the theoretical validity of a category of negative orders
may be otherwise, they have one thing in common in that they stand until set
aside. It is inherent in a decision, reviewable or otherwise,4 which simply says
"no" that it needs no further execution. Where judicial review is available the
decision might subsequently be changed, although in fact the courts often have
displayed an understandable reluctance to disturb "negative orders" 47 even
after the abandonment of the negative-order doctrine.48 But in any event the
decision stands until changed and, as far as the impact on the party is con-
cerned, the decision may be as positive or affirmative as any other. To the
union which is told that its grievance against a certain employer will not be
entertained, this is pro tanto a decision that the employer may further indulge
in the complained of conduct.49 An applicant whose license is not issued be-
cause he applied to the wrong authority is not prejudiced in that he may apply
to the right one; but if his application is turned down for any reason on what in
fact amounts to the merits, whether under the guise of a "jurisdictional" ruling
or otherwise, the decision needs no judicial enforcement to make it a ruling that
the applicant may not and therefore does not get the license he sought. That
this decision may have an additional, and likewise self-executing, effect on other
parties, such as members of the public or competitors, will be discussed below.
4462 Stat. 837 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. §3565 (1951); Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 38(a)(2)(3);
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 62.
45Consult Section 1009(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243 (1946),
5 U.S.C.A. §§1001-11 (1950), where stay may be granted if "justice so requires" but only
when judicial review is already pending. See Dolcin Corp. v. FTC, 219 F.2d 742 (App. D.C.,
1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 981 (1955), noted in 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1452 (1955).
4 Consult note 35 supra.
47 See NLRB v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684
(1951) (dictum approving Board's "de minimis" doctrine).
49 Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939), overruling Procter & Gamble
Co. v. United States, 225 U.S. 282 (1912).
4 This was pointed out in the dissent in Oregon Teamsters' Security Plan Office & William
C. Earhart, 113 N.L.R.B. 111 (1955), aff'd sub nom. Office Employees Int. Union v. NLRB,
235 F.2d 831 (App. D.C., 1956), cert. granted 352 U.S. 906 (1956).
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An agency may deny claims such as those for social security,50 workmen's
compensation or unemployment compensation.51 It may deny a passport to a
prospective traveler.5 2 A student may be denied admission to the state school,
and he may be vindicated in court if the decision was wrong and if he has the
time, money and stamina for a long-drawn litigation. But until he wins his cause
in court he loses so many state school terms." Rulings like these may be based
on findings that the applicant has not been employed sufficiently long to war-
rant social security benefits, that he became unemployed through his own fault,
that he is unfit to have this or that business license, that he belongs to a race not
admissible to "white" schools or that his travel abroad is "not in the best
interest of the government." In any case, these denials of applications are
executed upon rendition notwithstanding the possibility of judicial review.
At times the power at the government's disposal is so situated that an agency
can physically execute an affirmative decision, de facto as it were, because the
respondent party is unable to ward off an execution of perhaps dubious legal
basis. Thus a passport may not only be denied, but it may be taken away and
canceled if the government possesses the physical power to obtain the traveler's
passport. 4 Similarly, a policeman may "lift" an automobile driver's license.55
10 Hobby v. Hodges, 215 F.2d 754 (C.A. 10th, 1954).
51 Consult Parker, Administrative Law Problems in the Unemployment Insurance Program,
8 Vand. L. Rev. 436 (1955).
5" Consult Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 Col. L. Rev. 47 (1956); Parker,
The Right to Go Abroad: To Have and to Hold a Passport, 40 Va. L. Rev. 853, 857-61, 864-
65 (1954); The Passport Puzzle, 23 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 260 (1956). Recently, the State Depart-
ment's alleged right to curtail a citizen's right to travel abroad has been restricted, but only
to the extent of leaving the matter to the Department's "reasonable" discretion. Shachtman
v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (App. D.C., 1955). See Clark v. Dulles, 129 F.Supp. 950 (D. D.C.,
1955); Nathan v. Dulles, 129 F.Supp. 951 (D. D.C., 1955). Consult N.Y. Times §1, p. 14,
Col. 3 (Aug. 17, 1955) (passport refused to Paul Robeson). The refusal to grant a passport to a
foreign resident alleging to be an American citizen is reviewable. Yung Jin Teun v. Dulles,
229 F.2d 244 (C.A. 2d, 1956); Tom Mung Ngow v. Dulles, 122 F.Supp. 709 (D. D.C., 1954),
noted in 55 Col. L. Rev. 226 (1955).
3 In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), the petitioner applied for ad-
mission to the state university in the fall of 1935; the Supreme Court decided that he had a
right to be admitted in December, 1938; rehearing was denied January 3, 1939, 305 U.S. 676
(1939). In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), rehearing denied 340 U.S. 846 (1950), it
took nearly five years.
"4 E.g., Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F.Supp. 445 (D. D.C., 1952) (Secretary of State "through his
agents in Paris" revoked the plaintiff's passport). Federal Judge William Clark's passport
was taken away from him with the aid of dictator Franco's police. Parker, op. cit. supra note
22, at 859; Clark v. Dulles, 129 F.Supp. 950 (D. D.C., 1955). The passport of a client of this
writer was taken from him, at the behest of American consular authorities, by the then
fascist police of Vienna. For but a small fraction of the many recent instances of the "lifting"
of American citizens' passports consult Parker, op. cit. supra note 22, at 857-61.
56Silver v. McCamey, 221 F.2d 873 (App. D.C., 1955); Knoll v. Kelley, 142 Conn. 592,
115 A.2d 678 (1955); Marshall v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 324 Mass. 468, 87 N.E.2d 7
(1949); Wall v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 329 Mass. 70, 106 N.E.2d 425 (1952), aff'd sub
nom. Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878 (C.A. 1st, 1953); Matter of Moore v. MacDuff, 309 N.Y. 35,
127 N.E.2d 741 (1955).
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The licensee or passport holder may be able to obtain judicial relief and perhaps
ultimately have the satisfaction of hearing that the agency had no right to act as
it did, but until this is accomplished, if ever, he can neither drive nor travel.56 In
the procedure leading to denying (or granting) of a passport application, the
agency has all the means for executing its decision within its power; but in cancel-
ing or otherwise restricting a passport already issued and in the bearer's posses-
sion, the agency must use either persuasion to cause the owner to surrender the
document or else the executive arms of those foreign governments which willing-
ly (though no doubt not without amazement) cooperate with American consular
officials in their strange demands of stripping a citizen of a free country of the
right to be abroad. Should these means fail, the government would have to seek
judicial help to accomplish its purposes, though this writer knows of no case
where that actually happened.
Ordinarily the government must seek judicial assistance to expropriate pri-
vate property." But it can happen that it has the physical power to take by force
and is willing to exercise it, as demonstrated by the case of an American citizen
whose Austrian castle was "used" by the Army 38 As we shall presently see,
however, the instances of agency execution of affirmative decisions are not at all
confined to such extraordinarily situated cases where the agency may act be-
cause it possesses the physical powers to do so.
Emergency measures have long been recognized as a field in which the execu-
tive must act swiftly and may be called to judicial account either never or, at
any rate, only ex post facto 9 Time-honored examples include the shooting of a
mad dog6" or the seizure of gambling devices,"' unhealthy or falsely labeled food 2
or goods brought into the country in apparent violation of customs laws.6" The
expansion of this field can no longer be overlooked. Physical seizure of possession
of a home loan bank which, according to the seizing agency's findings had been
51 In Matter of Moore v. MacDuff, 309 N.Y. 35, 127 N.E.2d 741 (1955), the driver's license
was revoked in August, 1953, and the court of appeals decided in the driver's favor in June,
1955. In Dulles v. Nathan 225 F.2d 29 (App. D.C., 1955), the issuance of a passport was ac-
complished through judicial pressure after two and one-half years.
7 62 Stat. 935 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. §1358 (1950).
18 Seery v. United States, 127 F.Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl., 1955). Plaintiff is better known all over
the world under her maiden name, Maria Jeritza.
69 Davis, op. cit. supra note 6, at 260-64 (1951); Parker, op. cit. supra note 22, at 34-36
(1952); Stays of Federal Administrative Action, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 876 (1954).
0 Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891). The present-day tenability of the
decision, which granted a damage suit to the owner of a dog erroneously killed as mad by a
police officer, is doubtful. 63 Stat. 444 (1949), 28 U.S.C.A. §2680(a), (h) (1950) (no damage
suit under Federal Tort Claims Act for abuse of discretion or for intentional torts).
61 E.g., Bedenbaugh v. National Surety Corp., 130 F.Supp. 108 (N.D. Ga., 1955) (seizure
of gambling machines by F.B.I. agents).
"Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
6" United States v. 532.33 Carats, More or Less, of Cut and Polished Diamonds, 137 F.Supp.
527 (D. Mass., 1955).
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mismanaged,64 is not quite on the mad dog or roulette level, nor is the seizure
and sale of private property by Internal Revenue agents under certain circum-
stances prior to court review.6 5
The impounding of a person's mail can be perpetrated pursuant to an ad-
ministrative decision called mail fraud order6 or because the article is ad-
ministratively held to be nonmailable.17 Judicial review will be, of course,
available,6 8 but even if the court works very fast it will take many months
during which the aggrieved party must do without mail.69
Post office decisions like these are often arrived at after quasi-judicial pro-
ceedings,70 an observation that could lead to the more general question of the
extent to which courts are better equipped to render decisions that are peculiar-
ly within the province of a given agency-a problem not attempted to be solved
here.71 The decision, on the other hand, that the American nation may not get
certain mail which postal officials regard as "subversive" is not based on any
quasi-judicial trial and yet this kind of decision has been rendered without in-
hibition or court control for years. 72 The recent decision of the Post Office De-
partment that (only) people with "a serious interest" who have "a genuine use"
may "now" receive periodicals from Russia more easily,73 by its de facto execu-
tion through postal clerks, deprives people who are not, by postal standards,
worthy of the right to receive any kind of printed mail from the 'Soviet Union.
Apparently the freedom of the press does not include the freedom to read. How-
ever, it is not the purpose of this study to examine the legal validity of such acts,
but merely to register the fact that they are being perpetrated by administrative
agencies without, or at any rate prior to, court review.
There are, however, even more important liberties that may be encroached
64 Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Home Loan Bank Board v. Mallonee, 196 F.2d
336 (C.A. 9th, 1952), cert. denied sub nom. Wilmington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Home
Loan Bank Board, 345 U.S. 952 (1953).
6q5 Consult discussion at 306 infra.
16 E.g., Stanard v. Olesen, 74 S.Ct. 768 (1954); Door v. Donaldson, 195 F.2d 764 (App. D.C.,
1952) (Administrative Procedure Act applicable); Jeffries v. Olesen, 121 F.Supp. 463 (S.D.
Calif., 1954).
'
7 E.g., Stanford v. Lunde Arms Corp., 211 F.2d 464 (C.A. 9th, 1954).
68 Door v. Donaldson, 195 F.2d 764 (App. D.C., 1952).
69 In Jeffries v. Olesen, 121 F.Supp. 463 (S.D. Calif., 1954) the fraud order was issued on
July 27, 1953; thus the plaintiff was "[e]ffectively and completely put out of business by a
single awesome stroke of the pen." Ibid., at 470. The court set it aside on May 13, 1954, nine
and one-half months later.
70 Door v. Donaldson, 195 F.2d 764 (App. D.C., 1952). But see Stanard v. Olesen, 74
S.Ct. 768 (1954).
1 For classics on this problem see O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504
(1951); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322
U.S. 111 (1944).
72 As early as 1940 the writer's wife worked in an office of the Post Office Department where
incoming foreign printed matter was censored.
7 3N.Y. Times p. 17, col. 1 (Aug. 20, 1955).
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upon without or prior to judicial intervention. The country's chief prosecutor,
upon a presidential ukase proclaiming a national emergency, may detain any
person "as to whom there is reasonable ground to believe" that he "probably"
will commit espionage or sabotage. A warrant for arrest and detention is to be
made out not by a court but by the Attorney General or his subordinates. Sub-
sequent judicial review is preserved, of course, but he who resists or even "know-
ingly disregards" his apprehension subjects himself to imprisonment up to ten
years.74 There are as yet no decisions dealing with our future concentration
camps,76 but from our past experience" it is quite possible that this kind of law
will be upheld.7
7
The Attorney General has other powers for which he needs no courts. He can
exclude certain aliens,7 1 an authority which as an inevitable incident includes
de facto the power to exclude by mistake, at least for a time, one who is in fact
a citizen or an alien who ought not to have been excluded.7 9 He may detain
certain aliens if they are enemies,"0 and it can happen that a man so held turns
out after several years to be an allied alien, as in the notorious Gregoire cases. 81
And he can without judicial warrant or permission of any kind arrest and detain
aliens for deportation,82 an authority which again implicitly includes power to
determine jurisdiction, as well as the power to make a wrong decision. The long
and the short of this is that the Attorney General may, and indeed does, arrest,
hold and detain "deportees" who, as it often later turns out, are not deportable
74 Emergency Detention Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1021-22 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. §§812-14
(1951).
75 Worried citizens may derive comfort from a description of several of these camps in
N.Y. Times, p. 6, col. 3 (Dec. 27, 1955).
71 Consult Rostow, Our Worst Wartime Mistake, 191 Harper's, No. 1144, at 193 (Sept.,
1945), showing the fearful precedent we established in detaining American and alien citizens
of Japanese extraction.
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943) (both cases upholding detention of Japanese Americans). But see Ex
Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 284 (1944).
78 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 195 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. §§1221-30
(1953). Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904) (Puerto Rican, upon arrival at New York,
unlawfully detained and denied entry as "foreign immigrant").
79 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (alien resident unlawfully excluded
and detained by immigration authorities); United States ex rel. Baglivo v. Day, 28 F.2d 44
(S.D. N.Y., 1928) (native of Pennsylvania unlawfully excluded as alien); Haymes v. Brownell,
131 F.Supp. 784 (D. D.C., 1955) (alien unlawfully refused "entry" from Hawaii). Consult
Constitutional Restraints on the Expulsion and Exclusion of Aliens, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 440
(1953); Developments in the Law-Immigration and Nationality, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 643 (1953).
80 Alien Enemy Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 577 (1798), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. §21 (1951);
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
81 United States ex rel. Gregoire v. Watkins, 164 F.2d 137 (C.A. 2d, 1947) (plaintiff kept in
custody as alien for almost five years despite Enemy Alien Hearing Board's ruling that he was
a Frenchman); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (C.A. 2d, 1949), cert. denied 339 U.S. 949
(1950) (no cause of action for damages for this unlawful detention).
12 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. §1252 (1953).
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and hence should never have been detained.83
Another example of what the Attorney General may do is furnished by the
well-known "Attorney General's List." Certain allegedly subversive organiza-
tions were put on it without the benefit of a hearing. This was declared uncon-
stitutional. 84 Yet, these organizations had, in fact unlawfully, been on the List
for some years, that is, until the Supreme Court spoke. Moreover, and more
important, the Court's decision had no visible practical effect whatsoever,," for,
as is known to every reader of newspapers and governmental forms, the List has
been in use ever after despite the unconstitutional manner in which it was
established.8 Every applicant for any civil or military service position is still
being asked whether he belongs or ever belonged to an "organization on the At-
torney General's List," 87 even though that List is legally a nullity. As the law
stands at the time of this writing only two organizations have been ordered to
register.88 Yet the recently published Internal Security Manual again reprints
the List of more than 200 organizations,89 as if the Court had never spoken.
This proves again that even our government, although it "must operate within
the law,"90 will at times do what it physically can do. 1
That it can happen here on a very large, even national scale has been con-
vincingly demonstrated by what may be considered the Hawaiian experiment
of World War II. Martial law of at least dubious validity was enforced so ef-
fectively in that territory that its judicial test was rendered difficult, indeed
prohibited !12 Court review was eventually accomplished, to be sure. In Febru-
83 E.g., Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637 (1954), aff'g 207 F.2d 398 (C.A. 9th, 1953) (alien
put in custody July 25, 1951; released as not deportable more than two years later); United
States ex rel. Alcantra v. Boyd, 222 F.2d 445 (C.A. 9th, 1955) (similar; twenty months);
United States v. Heikkinen, 221 F.2d 890 (C.A. 7th, 1955) (similar). See Ocon v. Landon,
218 F.2d 320 (C.A. 9th, 1954) (no legal right to be released on bail pending determination of
deportability for communist activities).
84 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
8 5 Except that the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee itself was eventually removed
from the list of organizations required to be registered with the Subversive Activities Control
Board. Letter dated June 2, 1955 from Chairman Thomas J. Herbert to Senator Wiley, Sen.
Doc. No. 40, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. 353-54 (1955). See also joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Com-
mittee v. Brownell, 215 F.2d 870 (App. D.C., 1954).
81 The Attorney General's list was published in 18 Fed. Reg. 2741 (1953).
87 Consult e.g., Civil Service Commission form no. 385 (May, 1954).
18 Letter cited note 85 supra. See National Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 552
(App. D.C., 1955); Communist Party of America v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
223 F.2d 531 (App. D.C., 1954), rev'd 351 U.S. 115 (1956).
89 Sen. Doc. No. 40, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. 329-36 (1955). Consult The Legal Status of the
Attorney General's "List," 44 Calif. L. Rev. 748, 751 (1956).
8 Yanish v. Barber, 73 S.Ct. 1105, 1108 (1953).
"1 A fact which brings to mind the statement, true or legendary, ascribed to President
Jackson: "Well, John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it!" Corwin, The
President, Office and Powers 77 (1948).
92 For a detailed description and analysis consult Anthony, Hawaii Under Army Rule
(1955).
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ary, 1946 the Supreme Court ruled that military trials of civilians were not
authorized under the Hawaiian Organic Act.93 This decision clearly shows that
the administrative, especially the, military, arm can act contrary to law for
several years until the judiciary catches up with it. Next time it might take
longer.
In sum, judicial review is available against many of the discussed administra-
tive actions. Until a favorable court decision is procured, however, the ad-
ministrative decision not only "stands" but is "enforced" in the true sense of
the word.
Execution of Administrative Decisions After Judicial Review
Becomes Unavailable
Some affirmative agency decisions are executed by the agencies concerned
only after judicial review was either unsuccessfully sought or not sought during
the statutorily prescribed time. Thus, reviewable deportation orders are
executed by administrative authorities, and, though the Attorney General can
deport aliens with the help of the judiciary, the deportee cannot be deported
until either upon the alien's timely application the court has sanctioned the
deportation or until the time for judicial review has elapsed. 94 Also, the distraint
of property for delinquent federal taxes is accomplished by Internal Revenue
officials.9" Regularly, however, the tax claim will not become delinquent without
judicial review or an opportunity for it."
Agency Decisions That Are Executed Through the Cooperation
of a Party Primarily Affected
It would easily double the size of this article if an attempt were made to de-
termine just who under our administrative law is sufficiently aggrieved by an
administrative decision to have the right to seek judicial review.SZ In an ideal
society probably everybody who is affected in his economic or other status by a
decision could seek review. But, then, an ideal society would need no judicial
review of agency actions.
This problem arises even in court procedure, that is, in situations where a
93 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
94 66 Stat. 208(c) (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. §1252(c) (1953). See also Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349
U.S. 48 (1955), noted in 28 So. Calif. L. Rev. 407 (deportee may seek judicial review under
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act).
15 Int. Rev. Code §§6331-44, 26 U.S.C.A. §§6331-44 (1955).
91 Ibid., at §§6213(a), (c), 6861. In some emergency cases, however, the tax authorities
may both seize and sell property for the satisfaction of a tax claim and thus execute, subject
to belated court review, the tax deficiency decisions. See Denton v. United States, 132 F.Supp.
741 (D. N.J., 1955) (Commissioner may recover excessive refund by administrative assessment
and collection). Consult discussion at 301-2 supra.
,7Consult Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental Action, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 353
(1955), for a most scholarly discussion, which covers seventy-eight pages without solving the
problem.
19571
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
third party is affected by a court decree. Thus, a child's rights and happiness
may be quite obviously affected by a divorce or nullity decree, yet he has no
standing to attack the validity of the decree for want of jurisdiction,98 nor will
he be given party status so as to intervene in the divorce or annulment proceed-
ings. A paternity suit may, through the parties' connivance or even collusion,
end in a decision that might be of considerable importance to the parties' other
legitimate children, yet our state laws do not afford him standing in the pa-
ternity suit.99
However, these exceptions are infrequent, for court law is typically two-
party law and our refined rules of res judicata in this sense of the word see to it
that the old rule res iudicata facit ius inter partes01 is the prevailing principle
as far as the effect of court decisions goes. Where many parties are concerned,
the modern rules of procedure provide for class actions and for broad rights of
intervention. 01
Administrative law exists chiefly in the interest of the community as such,
and its decisions are quite frequently of importance to many. If A's license
application, for example for air carrier, is denied while B's application is
granted, the decisions may affect the well-being. of many separate communities.
They may have been represented in the administrative process leading to the
granting of the license, but that does not necessarily mean that the communi-
ties, much less their individual members, are entitled to judicial review.0 2
To remain within the same example, if B obtains the license, A, and perhaps
some members of the public, may seek review. But until they succeed the
decision is executed and B uses his license. 03 And if a state insurance com-
missioner refuses to approve an insurance company's purchase of certain real
property, 04 his decision can be executed there and then without court interven-
tion if the insurer acquiesces in the decree (or must so acquiesce for want of
judicial review facilities). The decision is executed as to the seller; he does not
sell. Whether he may have a cause of action, and against whom, is only impor-
tant to the question of judicial control ex post facto.
An employer may be told to disestablish what was found to be a company
"I Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
99 Consult 4 Vernier, American Family Laws 148-49, 206-19 (1936).
I'D Digest 50, 17, 217: Res judicata makes law between the parties (only).
101 E.g., Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23, 24.
102The right to intervene in the administrative procedure does not necessarily confer stand-
ing to seek judicial review. Pittsburgh & W.Va. Ry. Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 479, 486
(1930); Davis, op. cit. supra note 6, at 687-91 (1951). See Dallas v. CAB, 221 F.2d 501 (App.
D.C., 1954).
103 E.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 194 F.2d 339 (App. D.C., 1952) (license to airline
A granted May 25, 1950; airline B seeks judicial review and succeeds twenty months later);
San Miguel Power Ass'n v. Public Service Comm'n of Utah, 292 P.2d 511 (Utah, 1956) (non-
profit co-op not entitled to protest against power license grant to corporation).
104 Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Bohlinger, 308 N.Y. 174, 124 N.E.2d 110 (1954), noted in 24
Fordham L. Rev. 266 (1955) (no judicial review available).
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union in violation of Section 5(a) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act. The
employer may seek court review, but the decisions are conflicting as to whether
the company union may seek review.105 In any event, it may be said that it is
only against the employer that the NLRB decisions cannot be executed or
translated into the desired fact against a party's will unless by act of court;106
but the agency decision through its third-party effect remains executed, as far
as the alleged company union is concerned, if the employer complies.107 More-
over, where there are competing unions, one of which is certified by the NLRB,
and the employer does not refuse to bargain with it, the administrative decision
is pro tanto executed simply through the third-party effect of the decision.
What applies to licenses and their revocation is quite generally true whenever
administrative decisions are complied with by the party who is in what may be
said to be the primary power center. For instance, if the ICC promulgates a rule
providing for the discontinuance of a certain bus or railway line, the order can
be executed, or "carried out," by the discontinuance of the line as far as users
of the utility are concerned. If in the recent lottery broadcasting case'08 the
networks had complied with the FCC regulation forbidding "give-away" pro-
grams, 09 it would have been the end of this kind of radio entertainment, sub-
ject only to such vague and uncertain possibilities as might have been had by
individual radio stations, sponsors with contractual rights, or even the general
public."0
Execution of Administrative Decisions Through the Judiciary
The foregoing has been intended to show that a great many administrative
acts are executed by agencies, either with finality or at least for the time being.
Yet there are decisions that can be executed only by the judicial arm. Unfortu-
nately, there is no common denominator that would furnish us with a cate-
gorical criterion as to when this or that type of execution lies. It is not the rela-
tive importance of an administrative matter that would subject it to judicial
scrutiny prior to execution. Thus a subpena is ordinarily a matter of mere
ephemeral importance, incidental to some other proceedings. Yet it can only
111 See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) (AFL union held indispensa-
ble party in proceeding against employer charged with having contracted with AFL to defeat
competing union). But see NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines Inc., 303 U.S. 261
(1938) (company union not indispensable party in proceedings against employer charged with
having supported a company-dominated union).
11 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) (quoted in text at note 9
supra).
117 Either forever, under NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines Inc., 303 U.S. 261
(1938); or at least until the aggrieved union succeeds in court, under Consolidated Edison Co.
v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
109 FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954).
109 47 Code Fed. Regs. §§3.192, 3.292, 3.656 (Supp., 1956).
no Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (C.A. 2d, 1953) (food consumer has standing to seek re-
view of Food and Drug Administrator's decision against producer of fish oils).
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be "enforced" through the judicial proceeding.1 1 In recent years, it is true,
the courts have refused to examine the validity of the claim or right for the sake
of whose prosecution or investigation the subpena is issued."1 Still, the mere fact
that a court procedure is needed for the execution of a subpena may and often
does mean a considerable loss of time." 3 And so we encounter the strange pic-
ture that a person may be administratively arrested there and then as a prospec-
tive deportee even though he may later turn out not to be deportable," 4 but if
his status is merely to be inquired into, the efficacy of the subpena to that effect
may be successfully postponed for some time by not obeying the summons until
the courts have spoken."'
Preliminarily it may be noted that, surprisingly enough, non-reviewabiity
and agency execution are not necessarily one and the same. A decision may by
command of the enabling statute be unreviewable, and yet in some cases might
be capable of effective execution only with the aid of a court. This is the situa-
tion under the draft laws. If a person is determined to be fit for military service
by the draft board but refuses to be inducted the board's decision cannot be
carried out by the military arm."' As long as he is still a civilian his defection
is a crime to be tried in the ordinary civil courts. The decision of the military
authorities is unreviewable, other than administratively, according to the
wording and intention of the law,17 but the enforcement of the decision is left
to the courts." 8
M Section 5(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act states that '"[u]pon contest the court
shall sustain any subpena"; Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure
Act 68 (1947). Some state administrative agencies have authority to punish for contempt of
their subpenas. Gellhorn and Byse, Administrative Law 624-25 (1954).
"' Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Endicott Johnson Corp.
v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943); Lansky v. Savoretti, 220 F.2d 906 (C.A. 5th, 1955); Barnes v.
Oddo, 219 F.2d 137 (C.A. 2d, 1955); Carroll Vocational Institute v. United States, 211 F.2d
539 (C.A. 5th, 1954); Tobin v. Banks & Rumbaugh, 201 F.2d 223 (C.A. 5th, 1953) (no change
effected by Administrative Procedure Act §5[c]). For an excellent discussion consult United
States v. Zuskar, 237 F.2d 528 (C.A. 7th, 1956).
"I Gellhorn and Byse, Administrative Law 622-23 (1954).
114 Cases cited note 83 supra.
"5 E.g., Barnes v. Oddo, 219 F.2d 137 (C.A. 2d, 1955); Lansky v. Savoretti, 220 F.2d 906
(C.A. 5th, 1955).
"I Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
n7 62 Stat. 622 (1948), 50 U.S.C.A. App. §462(a) (1951).
u8 In actual fact, however, this legal situation has led to what might be called judicial re-
view through the back door of "jurisdiction." The courts do not always enforce draft board
decisions by mechanically finding that a crime is committed whenever an inductee fails to
report for duty, regardless of whether the board's decision was correct or not. Rather, in what
one might think a clear statutorily established non-review situation, they have obtained
effective review powers. This has been accomplished by holding that the draft board may act
only if it has "jurisdiction," and that, "if there is no basis in fact for the classification" the
draft board gave the registrant, the board's decision is rendered without jurisdiction and is
void. Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955); Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385
(1955); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946); Bejelis v. United States, 206 F.2d
354 (C.A. 6th, 1953).
[Vol. 24
THE EXECUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS
In some instances the judicial branch of government is merely authorized to
support and put additional teeth into the enforcement of administrative
decisions. Thus even though the distraint of property for delinquent taxes is
carried out by the tax agency,11 9 willful tax evasion is a judicially punishable
crime.un A Loyalty Board decision denying employment is ordinarily self-
executory (perhaps subject to subsequent court review), inasmuch as it is
addressed to the government itself and the thus proscribed employee alone has
practically no physical power to defy the order.12' In a more uncommon case,
however, where three seamen who were denied private employment by the
Board because of alleged subversive affiliations, but accepted employment
anyway, the Board in aid of its decision invoked judicial proceedings by having
the recalcitrant sailors indicted for violation of the Magnuson Act. 2 In this
particular instance, the indictment was dismissed for want of due administra-
tive process as the basis of the Loyalty Board's order. 2 Deportation orders 24
can ordinarily be executed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
albeit pursuant to a judicial review only recently enlarged so as to afford a
deportee nearly the same procedural rights as if, say, the taking by the govern-
ment of an acre of arid land belonging to the same alien were involved.12 But
deportation orders can also be fortified through criminal proceedings. If the
alien wilfully fails to apply for traveling papers he can be imprisoned up to
ten years at hard labor."16
In other instances, however, the law is so organized that the agency is com-
pletely powerless to execute its decisions without the aid from the judiciary,
"I Int. Rev. Code §§6331-43, 26 U.S.C.A. §§6331-43 (1955).
120 Ibid., at §§7201-4; United States v. Smith, 206 F.2d 905 (C.A. 3d, 1953).
2 An attempt to remain at his desk would no doubt be unceremoniously ended by the
maintenance crew. This actually happened to the United States Chief judge in Germany,
William Clark, who was dismissed from office but at least attempted to continue to hold
court until his successor took physical possession of the court's offices. N.Y. Times, p. 18,
col. 2 (Dec. 15, 1953).
'' United States v. Gray, 207 F.2d 237 (C.A. 9th, 1953), noted in 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1077
(1954).
" Ibid.; Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (C.A. 9th, 1955).114 Distinguish this from the preliminary decision to detain an alien pending deportation
proceedings, which falls into our second category, as being carried out by the agency itself,
subject to subsequent court review.
,21 Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 348 U.S. 882 (1955) (deportee may seek declaratory judgment
under Section 10 of Administrative Procedure Act). It was recently proposed to change the
deportation proceedings themselves to approximate Sections 5, 7 and 8 of that Act. 20 Fed.
Reg. 5,729 (Aug. 9, 1955). In view of the harsh provisions of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 185 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. §§101(b)(4), 236, 242 (1953), these new regulations
must be considered as praeter legem. Report of the President's Commission on Immigration
and Naturalization: Whom We Shall Welcome 159-60 (1953); Sen. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong.
2d Sess. 28 (1952). See United States ex rel. Befrage v. Kenton, 224 F.2d 803, 805 (C.A. 2d,
1955) (Administrative Procedure Act not applicable to deportation proceedings).
"1' United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169 (1952) (alien had not, or not properly, applied to
Soviet Embassy for passport but had emigrated to this country from Russia in 1913).
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whose decision, then, is not a mere implementation of the administrative
action but rather amounts to the final decision. It is these with which this
section is primarily concerned. In some of these cases the technique of the law
renders a violation of the agency decision a criminal offense, as in the case of
violations of cease and desist orders of the FTC,"7 of regulations or orders of
the Wage and Hour Administration12 s or of induction orders of the draft
boards.129 The judiciary, however, in.these instances does not merely pronounce
the existence of the administrative order and its violation. Rather, the court
examines the validity of the order to a varying degree, even where, as in the
draft board cases, the law proclaims the administrative order to be "final."
As we have seen, in such a situation it has been found expedient to say that the
agency had no "jurisdiction" to arrive at a decision that appeared to be
patently wrong to a majority of the members of the Supreme Courtj 30
A second, and rather weak, means of judicial execution of agency decisions is
a civil suit, such as to enforce a statutory penalty,' or to restore excessive rent
to overcharged tenants' 32 or for an injunction to comply with an order.'33 Such
suits are time consuming. 3 4
Finally, the least efficient method of administrative law execution is the one
by which the NLRB's cease and desist orders are "enforced" by the courts of
127 38 Stat. 719 (1925), 15 U.S.C.A. §45(1) (1951).
'n Fair Labor Standards Act §§15(a)(2), 16, 52 Stat. 1068, 1069 (1949), 29 U.S.C.A.
§§215(a)(2), 216 (1956).
,U9 Consult discussion at 308 supra. 130 Ibid.
' The inherent weakness of this kind of law execution is aptly demonstrated by some
recent cases: United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 199 F.2d 223 (C.A. 7th, 1952), cert.
denied 345 U.S. 908 (1953) (suit for enforcement of penalty under Federal Safety Appliance
Acts dismissed); United States v. Lynn, 132 F.Supp. 605 (E.D. Ky., 1955) (suit for statutory
penalty dismissed because court disagreed with agency's findings and construction of Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act); United States v. Harvey, 131 F.Supp. 493 (N.D. Tex., 1954) (judg-
ment for defendant in penalty suit under Agricultural Adjustment Act where administrative
proceedings were faulty, despite defendant's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies).
132 E.g., United States v. Jacovetty, 204 F.2d 376 (C.A. 4th, 1952). Contra: Smith v.
United States, 199 F.2d 377 (C.A. 1st, 1952), noted in 66 Harv. L. Rev. 918 (1953) (treble
damage suit not maintainable because of court's different conclusion from that of rent adminis-
trator, despite landlord's failure to exhaust administrative remedies); United States v. Me-
Crillis, 200 F.2d 884 (C.A. 1st, 1952) (similar).
"33 E.g., Seipel v. SEC, 229 F.2d 758 (App. D.C., 1955) (injunction suit to enjoin invest-
ment adviser's practices). See United States v. McCrillis, 200 F.2d 884 (C.A. 1st, 1952) (in-
junction against rent overcharge denied); United States v. Sanders, 196 F.2d 894 (C.A. 10th,
1952) (contempt for failure to comply with injunction to refrain from circulating misbranded
drugs in interstate commerce); United States v. 3 Cartons, etc., 132 F.Supp. 569 (S.D. Calif.,
1952) (libel against misbranded goods); United States v. Shafer, 132 F.Supp. 659 (D. Md.,
1955) (injunction granted to restrain farmers from preventing Government agents to enter
upon their farms).
134 Thus, to pick two examples at random from the preceding footnote, in 3 Cartons, the
quack medicines were shipped "during 1949" and the trial court's decision was rendered in
November, 1952. In Sanders, a case of unusual judicial speed, the complained-of sale took
place in January and the injunction was not issued before October, 1951; in May, 1952, the
appellate court reversed and remanded to the district court upholding the Government's
petition for criminal contempt.
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appeals and then executed through the tedious method of contempt pro-
cedure."' If a respondent, employer or union, so chooses he may with some skill
delay the translation into fact of the Board's order by many years."6 And it is
not only the length of time and considerable expenditure of money'3 7 that has
often rendered labor law enforcement a pastime for lawyers accomplishing
little of practical value,"" but also the very nature of a contempt procedure
itself. For, at least under the older doctrine, not only is the "heavy" burden of
proving the contempt upon the agency,'39 but also the evidence must be "Clear,
convincing, and satisfactory"; 14 0 and worse yet, the evidence is often received
by a special master. In the agency's decree for which execution is sought, the
facts found by the agency are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence
considering the record as a whole;'4' moreover, the agency's solution of legal
questions whose adjudication falls peculiarly within the expert province of the
agency will generally be accorded great weight by the courts.' And thus the
Board issues, and the court approves, an order directing the employer to cease
and desist from certain practices. If, however, the respondent is not obliging
enough to cease and desist, no expert body is called upon to decide the issue.
Rather, this is done by a "master"-a local lawyer in good standing but not
necessarily endowed with any expert knowledge in the agency's field. This has
often produced unfortunate results.' The NLRB and some of the courts have
115 Consult Parker, Contempt Procedure in the Enforcement of Administrative Orders,
40 Ill. L. Rev. 344 (1946); The Role of Contempt Proceedings in Enforcing Orders of the
N LRB, 54 Col. L. Rev. 603 (1954). Consult also Parker, Administrative Law 283-84 (1952);
Gellhorn and Byse, op. cit. supra note 6, at 624. Subpenas likewise are "enforced" through
contempt proceedings under Section 6(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act.
136 Consult the cases in Parker, Contempt Procedure in the Enforcement of Administrative
Orders, 40 Ill. L. Rev. 344, 347 (1946), and 60 Harv. L. Rev. 973 (1947); NLRB v. Retail
Clerks' Int'l Ass'n, 211 F.2d 759 (C.A. 9th, 1954) (unfair labor practice charge filed December,
1948; Board's settlement decree entered September, 1949; "enforced" by consent decree in
Court of Appeals January, 1950; final decision holding respondent in contempt for failure to
obey April, 1954); West Texas Utilities Co. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 442 (App. D.C., 1953) (three
years from appellate court's approval of Board's order to contempt decree). See United
States v. Sanders, 196 F.2d 894 (C.A. 10th, 1952).
"17 In the contempt procedure following NLRB v. Sunshine Mining Co., 110 F.2d 780 (C.A.
9th, 1940), enforcing 7 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1938), cert. denied 312 U.S. 678 (1941), the master's
fee amounted to $25,000.00. The contempt petition was filed on April 3, 1942, the master's
final report was filed on December 12, 1944, and the approval date was January 6,1945. Parker,
Contempt Procedure in the Enforcement of Administrative Orders, 40 111. L. Rev. 344 (1946).
138 Consult the critical remarks in Cox, Cases on Labor Law 388 (3d ed., 1954).
13" Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. NLRB, 137 F.2d 77, 79 (C.A. 8th, 1943).
140 NLRB v. Giannasca, 119 F.2d 756 (C.A. 2d, 1941).
1' Administrative Procedure Act §§7(c), 10(e)(5); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474 (1951).
'
4 2 O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951); SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194 (1947); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
143 See Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. NLRB, 137 F.2d 77 (C.A. 8th, 1943), where the
lack of understanding of labor law is equalled only in the contempt procedure of NLRB v.
Budd Mfg. Co., 142 F.2d 922 (C.A. 3d, 1944). See also NLRB v. Warren Co., 214 F.2d 449
(C.A. 5th, 1955).
19571
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
worked out some measure of relief in this situation. Many courts, some of them
still grudgingly, now let the contempt facts be found by the Board itself by
remanding the case to it, subject to the continued jurisdiction of the court, "for
investigation and report to this court.1 44 Though this is still far from ideal, or
even good, law enforcement it is at least better than the mockery of "com-
mitting the last perhaps most delicate step of labor enforcement-proceedings
in contempt-to somewhat alien professional interest as in effect a court of first
instance," a procedure by which "we lose the very quality of expertness and
wise discretion" which has led to the creation of administrative agencies. 5
There are other instances of execution of administrative decisions through
contempt,14 but nowhere has this mode of procedure been quite so pernicious
as in the law of labor relations.
In presenting this picture we have not been able to set forth a ratio legis, that
is, an explanation of the principle by which the legal system is guided in letting
administrative decisions be executed this way or that. Why can important
decisions involving liberty and property be carried out by administrative
agencies, whereas a mere subpena must be judicially enforced? And while the
courts to a large extent bow to the agencies' expertise and experience in making
their decisions, the picture changes when this decision is to be executed by a
non-expert court ''master."
It might be said that the question is one of "power distribution." But
"power" is either physical power or it means legal authority. It is true that
agencies can and hence do execute their orders because they are physically
capable to do so. Negative decisions such as decisions not to grant a passport
or license could be so classified. The agency there exercises its physical power
not to act. As to affirmative decisions, however, executions based on physical
power regardless of legal justification, fortunately for our legal civilization, are
rare. Aside from negative decisions where the agency's power not to act is
inherent, decisions are generally executed by agencies only if the agency is so
authorized. This realization has, of course, led us into a circle; agencies have
authority to execute their decisions if they are so authorized. And no common
144NLRB v. Western Cartridge Co., 138 F.2d 551 (C.A. 2d, 1943), cert. denied 321 U.S.
786 (1944). With this case the practice started in the Second Circuit. It has spread to other
circuits. Consult Parker, Contempt Procedure in the Enforcement of Administrative Orders,
40 Il1. L. Rev. 344 (1946); The Role of Contempt Proceedings in Enforcing Orders of the
NLRB, 54 Col. L. Rev. 603 (1954). See NLRB v. Venetian Blind Workers' Union Local
2565, 207 F.2d 124 (C.A. 9th, 1953); NLRB v. Retail Clerks' Int'l Ass'n, 203 F.2d 165 (C.A.
9th, 1953) (good survey of the scope and limitations of the new doctrine); NLRB v. Dixon,
189 F.2d 38 (C.A. 8th, 1951) (extent to which respondent is able to comply may be left to
Board's determination). But see NLRB v. Warren Co., 214 F.2d 481 (C.A. 5th, 1954) (court
refused to hold respondent in contempt, ruling that it, not the Board, must determine "what
will best serve the public and at the same time vindicate its own decree"), rev'd 350 U.S. 107(1955).
145 NLRB v. Giannasca, 119 F.2d 756, 759 (C.A. 2d, 1941) (concurring opinion).
146 Authorities cited notes 89-94 supra.
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rationale of importance or expediency can be determined to explain why the
distribution of authority, or "power," is just this way and not otherwise. It
is a part, but only a part, of the bigger question why the task of making certain
kinds of decisions has been assigned to administrative agencies and others to the
courts.
The Administrative Procedure Act is silent on the whole subject, as is a
recent proposal of an Administrative Code.1 47 The most intelligently written
administrative procedure law, the Massachusetts act,148 likewise has no pro-
vision on the execution of administrative decisions.
Legislation might seem apposite, but it must come sine ira et studio. A general
outcry "more power to the courts" would be as unsatisfactory a basis for reform
as the demand to leave everything to the agencies. The latter bears the danger of
an increase of rash political decisions such as have occurred in the past. To curb
agencies, on the other hand, by letting any execution that needs further
action 49 be physically enforced only by the courts would be equally unsatis-
factory in view of the time and money that would be thereby consumed. More-
over, cases such as Sacco-V'anzetti and a recent one01 0 where a man had been
kept in jail for twenty-four years, the only evidence being a forced confession to
a crime neither he nor anyone else had committed, severely test our belief in
the natural-law inspired creed of the infallibility of judges.
In any event it should be realized that administrative agencies do execute
their decisions to a large extent, at times in an irrational manner. Such a
realization suggests the need for a rational, coordinated and, perhaps someday,
codified"' system of administrative execution, a system which might well
include an office of administrative enforcement.
14 Administrative Code Bill in Report on Legal Services and Procedure, prepared for the
Commission on Organization of the Executive Board of the Government by the Task Force on
Legal Services and Procedure 359 (March, 1955); 7 Ad. L. Bull. 132-72 (1955).
148 Act of June 10, 1954, c.681, Gen. Laws c.30(A).
148 Strictly self-executory decisions, such as many "negative" ones, of course would not be
capable of execution through the judiciary.
160 United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F.Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill., 1949).
161 The writer knows of only one foreign country that has what may truly be called a com-
prehensive code of administrative law. Austria has four statutes on administrative procedure,
one of which, the Vervaltungsvollstreckungsgeselz, deals in thirteen sections with execution
problems concededly simpler than those of a common-law country. Das Verwaltungsverfahren
387-417 (Mannlicher, 5th ed., 1951); 1 Adamovich, Handbuch des dskrreichischn Ver-
wallungsrechts 280-84 (5th ed., 1954); Parker, Review of 1 Adamovich, Handbudc des ester-
reichischen Verwallungsrechts, 5 AmJ. Comp. L. 146, 149 (1956).
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